

Chapter 5

Unchanged Goals and Strategies but Limited Outcomes

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Introduction

In this article, the author explains that the starting point of the New Brazil in terms of foreign policy was during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration (1995-2002). However, the real creators of the New Brazil, and the real turning point, came with the Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010). Lula was a president who prioritized foreign policy and tried to lead Brazil so that it could act as a global player.

Due to several factors, both domestic and international, Brazil suffered through the continuation of the New Brazil's policies. This is true for foreign policy, too. During the four years of Dilma Rousseff's first term (2011-2014), the active foreign policy that embodied the New Brazil almost disappeared. Post-New Brazil's foreign policies became inactive and sometimes inconsistent. Now, after the recent presidential election, the most urgent issue for the Rousseff government is an economic recovery and it seems difficult to give priority to foreign policies at the moment.

1. The New Brazil's Foreign Policies: The Cardoso Administration

Here, the author describes the diplomacy of Cardoso administration. Brazil actively participated in multilateral negotiations and tried to promote the South American integration. Under the leadership of Cardoso, Brazilian foreign policy really changed from being low profile to being active in the international community.

1.1. Autonomy through Participation: The Beginning of Active Diplomacy

The Cardoso administration began in January 1995. In the presidential election in October 1994, Cardoso received 54.5 % of the vote due to his popularity as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from October 1992 to May 1993 and as the Minister of Finance from May 1993 to March 1994 during his predecessor Itamar Franco's administration. The

economic stabilization policy, the Real Plan which Cardoso created in his time as finance minister was able to defeat 4-digit hyperinflation (See Chapter 2). He was not only a professor at the University of São Paulo (USP) but he also had rich experience as a politician. Since he led the democratization of Brazil in opposition to the military regime (1964-1985), the public placed great trust in Cardoso. He was also famous as a prominent sociologist within the international community.

Brazilian foreign policy researchers, Vigevani and Cepaluni, define the Cardoso diplomacy using the concept of “participation” [Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007]. It is a concept that describes a type of diplomacy whereby Brazil maintains its autonomy by participating actively in the international community and multilateral talks. During Cardoso’s administration, by putting into practice a multilateral diplomacy, such as on human rights and nuclear non-proliferation, Cardoso conducted active diplomacy. For example, Brazil’s human rights-oriented attitude was reflected in the case against western countries over AIDS drug patents. In Brazil, anti-AIDS drugs had been freely distributed since 1996. However, the treatment involved generic drugs that had copied Western pharmaceutical companies’ products. Manufacturing these copies infringed patents, and Western countries sued Brazil in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Brazil, appealing to the world through the United Nations and the World Health Organization (WHO) with the argument that life (human rights) should be superior to profits, was heeded with the result that the Western companies cut the prices of their drugs [Koyasu 2004].

On nuclear non-proliferation, Brazil not only ratified the Latin American regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco in May 1994, but also signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998. Both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were “taboo” subjects from the 1960s to the 1980s due to there being a military regime in Brazil. After democratization in the mid-1980s, the Cardoso administration could finally tackle these issues in a positive way.

As a symbol of the active participation of Brazil in the international community we can point to the election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. As of January 2013, Brazil, like Japan, has been elected ten times to be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; this is more than any other country. It is interesting to note the years when Brazil was chosen. After 1967-1968, the next election happened in 1988-1989. After that, Brazil was elected in 1994-1995, 1998-1999, 2004-2005 and 2010-2011.

The first two elections almost overlap with the Cardoso administration, with the

remaining two periods belonging to the Lula administration. Brazil was not elected during the economic instability in the era of the military regime from 1964 to 1985, but in the 1990s Brazil was received again as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. We can say the same thing about UN peacekeeping operations. Since the 1990s, Brazil has been participating actively not only in election monitoring and military surveillance activities but also in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and Central America.

Brazilian diplomacy under the Cardoso administration especially its emphasis on the global agenda is reflected in the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since we call the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Itamaraty Palace” (*Palácio Itamaraty*), we tend to call the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Itamaraty.” The men who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cardoso administration were two specialists in the field of Brazilian diplomacy, Luiz Felipe Lampreia (1995-2001) and Celso Lafer (2001-2002). When Lampreia was Foreign Minister, the section responsible for issues such as human rights, social issues, and disarmament was created in Itamaraty. This reflected the domestic and global situation surrounding Brazil in the 1990s, for example, Brazil’s democratization and the end of the Cold War. [Gonzaga da Silva et al. 2010].

1.2. The Characteristics of Bilateral and Regional Relations

Although the Cardoso administration seemed to be more active in terms of multilateral talks and diplomatic activities in international organizations, it also paid a lot of attention to bilateral and regional diplomacy. Compared to the proportion of overseas stay for the inauguration period, while presidents of Sarney, Collor and Franco spent abroad 9%, 9.8%, and 5.2% of their time, respectively, Cardoso notched up 11.8%. (*Folha de São Paulo*, September 22nd, 2009). This is the reason why Cardoso’s diplomatic style is called “presidential diplomacy.”

As a main feature in terms of his destinations, Cardoso tended to travel more to developed nations such as the United States and Europe. The proportion occupied by these areas for all of stay number of countries was 49%. This is in contrast to his successor, President Lula, who went to more developing countries during his eight years. In relations with the United States, the traditional diplomatic partner for Brazil, US President Clinton (Bill Clinton) and Cardoso enjoyed six years of deep friendship as leaders of their countries. There were many confrontations in the relations between

Brazil and the United States during the Sarney government in the late 1980s, but Cardoso's relations with the United States of the Clinton era were generally friendly. The United States was also an important trade partner for Brazil. For example, in 2002, the last year of the Cardoso administration, 25.4% of total Brazilian exports was destined for the United States [Koyasu 2004]. On the other hand, the traditional Brazilian diplomatic stance, which does not entirely follow the US, was maintained. Especially on the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 during the Bush administration, Brazil made its attitude on the "war on terror" very clear. Brazil, in compliance with the Treaty of Inter-American Mutual Assistance Cooperation, would cooperate with the United States only if terrorism threatened the Western Hemisphere.

In the Cardoso administration, the relationship with South America was also emphasized. Southern Common Market (Mercosul) at that time consisted of four countries: Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. It was established in 1995 when Cardoso started his administration. Mercosul was the nucleus of Cardoso's South American diplomacy, and his aim was to promote South American integration.

In August 2000, a South American Summit of the leaders of the 12 countries of South America was held in Brasilia, the first time in history that all the leaders of South America had been called to meet together. President Cardoso, on the occasion of this summit, made a speech on the importance of South American integration since South American countries are the ones who knew the value of democracy and could share their problems of poverty and social injustice. Cardoso stated that South America should unite strongly to promote its economic development. This stance of prioritizing South American integration was also continued by Lula and Rousseff.

In terms of the relationships with Asia, Cardoso visited China shortly after his first inauguration. Historically, the proportion of Brazilian trade with China was not so high. For example, in 2002, the ratio of imports from China was only 4.18% of total imports to Brazil [Koyasu 2004], but the trade with China has gradually expanded its share. In 2001 China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) which succeeded to make China a strategic trade partner for Brazil.

In order to deepen the relationship between the Portuguese-speaking African countries, Brazil contributed to the launch of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) in cooperation with the government of Portugal in July 1996. Many Portuguese-speaking African countries were still suffering from political and economic instability even after their independence from Portugal in the 1970s, and Brazil sent many specialists in the areas of public health and medical assistance. In particular,

cooperation between Brazil and the CPLP countries on AIDS has been active. Toward Africa other than the Portuguese-speaking countries, the relationship with South Africa was expanded by the then-president, Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, and President Cardoso. President Mbeki was invited to the Mercosul summit in 2000 [Koyasu 2004].

2. The Lula Administration: The Real Turning Point of the New Brazil

The author will explain that the Brazilian foreign policy became more active by the Lula government. Lula not only participated actively in the global negotiations, but also had an objection to the present international order together with other developing nations. It was also a major change that the Brazilian foreign relations become more diversified under the Lula mandate.

2.1. From “Participation” to “Diversification”

In 2003, Brazil’s leader changed from Cardoso to Lula. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva grew up in a poor family and while he was working as a metal worker, he participated actively in the labor union, becoming a prominent leader among his comrades. Finally, when he was only 23 years old, he was elected to be the chairman of the 100,000 metal workers’ union in São Paulo. He led the democratic movement of Brazil, which happened in the first half of the 1980s, the so-called *Diretas Já* (a political movement to demand the direct election of the president) with the Workers’ Party (PT), to which Lula belonged. Now a person who was completely different from Cardoso, an elite-born president, was to be inaugurated as the Brazilian president.

The Brazilian business community showed some concern over Lula’s career as a union leader, saying that “when Lula was elected as president, economic policy might become more left-wing.” Also, many concerns about Brazil’s future were heard from the international financial community. In reality, President Lula inherited the economic policies of the Cardoso government. When he made clear that Brazil would have a pragmatic stance in macroeconomic policy, for example, economic stability, inflation control, the maintenance of a good relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the international community’s concerns about the Lula government were almost swept aside. It is said that the change in Lula’s attitude was influenced by Cardoso who had persuaded the then-presidential candidate, Lula, to take into consideration the domestic and international situation surrounding Brazil and give up his more left-wing

policies [Koyasu 2009].

Although Lula followed the pragmatic economic policy of the Cardoso administration, with his foreign policy he tried to focus more on developing nations. This trend was especially much stronger during Lula's first mandate (2003-2006). Since there was criticism from the PT of Lula's orthodox economic policy, Lula intended to show a more PT leader-like stance in the sphere of foreign policy. During the Lula administration, diplomatic relations with Africa and the Middle East really flourished. Brazil's diplomatic relations now became much more diversified.

2.2. An active Foreign Policy to Be Reinforced:

Seeking to Reform the Existent International Order

During the Cardoso administration, an active participation in multilateral consultations, especially related to human rights treaties and disarmament became remarkable. The Lula administration, however, took a more active stance by seeking a new international economic and political order from which the south could benefit. A good example was the G4 (Japan, Germany, India and Brazil), which was formed to press for the reform of the United Nations Security Council. These four countries strongly pushed for an increase in the number of permanent Security Council members since the present Security Council did not reflect the power balance of global politics in the 21st century.

As another example was the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations. The Summit of the Americas was inaugurated in December 1994 when President Bill Clinton was in the White House. The first meeting was held in Miami where all the nations of the Western Hemisphere participated, with the exception of Cuba. The FTAA initiative was proposed by President Clinton at this first Summit. However, the negotiations stagnated and the original plan to launch the FTAA in 2005 was almost impossible. On the 4th Summit of the Americas at Mar de La Plata in Argentina, November 2005, while the United States, Mexico and the Central American countries were for the proposal about the reopening of the FTAA negotiations, the Mercosul members, especially Brazil, were reluctant to agree to it. The final declaration was very unusual in that both the opinions for and against were incorporated.

Many in Latin America, including Brazil, made a complaint that the FTAA would be more advantageous for the United States. Brazil, in any case, had felt reluctant about the FTAA from the very beginning [Poggio Teixeira 2011] and it is noteworthy that

President Lula was one of the main members to say “no” to the US-led FTAA negotiations

In the WTO negotiations, Brazil often tried to correct the process of multilateral talks mostly led by developed countries. On the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, September 2003, President Lula launched the Group of 20 (we often call it the “commercial version of the G20” in order to distinguish it from the financial G20 version) composed of 20 developing countries which are opposed to the agricultural subsidies by developed countries’ governments. It was President Lula who called on the agricultural countries of the South to gather and participate in the WTO ministerial conference at Cancún. Brazil called for the industrialized countries to recognize that the inequality between the developed and developing countries have not been eliminated as long as trade rules such as on agricultural subsidies are preserved. Compared to the Cardoso diplomacy, these cases clearly represent Brazil’s strong attitude toward a globalized society.

However, it should not be overlooked that the Cardoso administration also called for the reduction and elimination of agricultural subsidies by the developed countries at the WTO conference at Doha in 2001. At that time, both the developed countries and the developing countries started a new round of negotiations, the so-called Doha Round. Brazil was one of the main countries who tried to put the agricultural subsidies’ issue onto the agenda. The Cardoso government was highly regarded as a key actor in starting the Doha Round and in trying to get both the abolition of agricultural subsidies and the possible limitation of patent protection for medicines onto the table.

Lula’s assertiveness was to continue well into his second term (2007-2010). In November 2008, the so-called financial G20 held a meeting in Washington, DC. One week before, when the G20 countries’ finance ministers and the presidents of the central banks gathered in São Paulo, Brazil, where the chair was, Brazil also attended adopting a firm position toward the developed nations. The commemorative photo, in which Lula is standing in the center with President Bush, is very impressive. In the following year, when the G20 summit was held in London, Brazil, with China, could still play a leading role.

Participation in the multilateral talks during the second term of President Lula was greater than in his first term. Brazil had many opportunities to participate in such multilateral arenas, and the international community increasingly thought that it could not solve global issues without the emerging countries. During the Lula administration, Brazil showed a stable economic growth and decreased slightly inequalities in income

distribution. Historically plagued by the repayment of debt to international financial institutions such as the IMF and the West, Brazil has now changed from being a debtor country to being a creditor. Due to the commodities' boom (for example, in soy, chicken, oranges, iron ore, and bioethanol), Brazil could become one of the world's leading exporters. With the Cardoso administration, the international community's reliance on Brazil began to grow, but it became even greater during Lula's administration.

2.3. South-South Relations

The Brazil of the Lula government tried to find partners that might share its ideas and positions. It is interesting that Celso Amorim, the foreign minister of the Lula government, commented that "to make friends (*amigos*) with anyone is Brazilian's best skill" [Dauvergne and Déborah Bl Farias 2012], and forming relationships with developing and emerging countries was one of the major features of Lula's foreign diplomacy. For a long time, as everyone knows, Brazil had been tackling many social and economic problems, such as poverty, economic inequality and social injustice. By applying these experiences to its foreign policy, Lula intended to advance south-south cooperation and support southern countries that were facing the same challenges as Brazil.

By the way, Lula's foreign policy is often compared with the one of the Geisel government (1974-79). The foreign policies of Geisel in the 1970s were called Ecumenically Responsible Diplomacy (*pragmatismo ecumênico responsável*) [Horisaka 1993]. Its main features were to have diplomatic relations with a variety of countries and nations. The concept of economic pragmatism was a priority for Brazil, not an ideology. Even though Brazil was a member of the west and a capitalist nation, Brazil did not necessarily follow the United States, but, at the same time, it was also reluctant to construct a solidarity movement with countries from the South.

The foreign policies of the Lula and Geisel governments can be said to share a common point in terms of being "ecumenical" (= multidimensional). However, since Lula's diplomacy prioritized south-south relations, his diplomacy was a little bit different from that of Geisel, who was reluctant to create solidarity with the South. Cardoso, also, was not active in promoting south-south relations. Rather, as already mentioned, Cardoso intended to obtain confidence in Brazil through creating strong relationships with developed countries, including the US and Europe

In other words, the emphasis on South-South relations was an important change

introduced by the Lula administration. The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), the South American-Arab Nations Summit, The South American-African Countries Summit are examples of Brazil and southern nations cooperating in order to be more autonomous while also sending a message to the rest of the world. In terms of the characteristics of each meeting, we can point to language (CPLP, for example), geography (Mercosul, UNASUR, and CELAC, for example), and history (the Ibero-American Summit, for example). Of the various meetings, IBSA is very novel since three nations (India, Brazil, and South Africa), completely different in terms of language and geography, are united. As an inter-regional institution, IBSA was constructed in order to tackle global issues from the South's point of view. IBSA is an institution of democratic nations; therefore it can be clearly distinguished from BRICS, of which China is a member.

South America was also important in terms of finding diplomatic partners. As already mentioned, the Cardoso government laid the path for South America integration and the Lula government accelerated all the processes related to this integration. The South American Community, which was created in December 2004, was renamed the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in April 2007. On May 2008, the Treaty of the Union of South American Nations was adopted in Brasília during an extraordinary session of the UNASUR Summit. UNASUR was created as a place where the twelve South American nations could unite and cooperate with each other in order to tackle common goals, such as democracy, poverty eradication and social justice.

In Mercosul, which has experienced many crises like the trade conflict between Argentina and Brazil, there is a structure called FOCEM (Mercosul's Fund for Structural Convergence), a foundation to redress economic imbalances among Mercosul countries [Pautasso 2012].

The completion of UNASUR is also a reflection of Lula's idea that South America is an important diplomatic arena. For the Lula government, initiatives to promote the unity of South America were essential for Brazil to having a much stronger voice in the international community as a global player.

3. Rousseff's Foreign Policies during her First Mandate:

Its Limited Outcomes

Now the author explains the Rousseff's foreign policy (1st mandate: 2011-2014). Before describing the South-South diplomacy and South America integration of

Rousseff government, it will be explained the study abroad program, Science without Frontiers (*Ciência sem Fronteiras*) launched under the leadership of Rousseff. During the Lula administration, Rousseff was a key cabinet member in posts such as the Chief Cabinet Secretary. She tried to inherit Lula's diplomatic strategy, in which Science without Frontiers was newly introduced by her government. Rousseff intended to maintain Brazil as a global player by focusing on relations with Latin America, strengthening relationships with emerging and developing countries, especially Africa and the Middle East, and by participating in regional and multilateral talks. However, as the author explains later, the foreign policies of the Rousseff administration were often seen inactive and sometimes inconsistent.

3.1. *Ciência sem Fronteiras*: The Program Emphasized in her Foreign Policies

Economic development and diplomatic relationships are traditionally strong in Brazil. President Rousseff, after taking office, soon released a new national study abroad program, Science without Frontiers, whose main purpose was to help excellent Brazilian undergraduates, doctoral and post-doctoral students and also researchers in areas such as science, medicine and engineering to study abroad¹. The program was to issue 100 thousand scholarships by 2015, but one more important purpose was to raise the level of Brazil's science and technology and innovation. This Science without Frontiers program was a matter of foreign policy due to the fact that in planning to send Brazilians abroad, it also promoted Brazil's economic development and internationalization. In her presidential address to Congress in January 2014, Rousseff emphasized that this program would form an important agenda in her diplomatic relations with countries that had high-levels of science and technology. Rousseff often visited countries where there was a possibility of sending Brazilian students and scholars. This might be one reason why she visited more developed countries than developing ones.

In March 2011, when Rousseff visited Obama in the United States, they agreed that it would be important for the US and Brazil to expand the study abroad program for students and scholars in the fields of science and technology between the US and Brazil.

¹ Since the fall of 2013, Japan is also accepting the Brazilian students and scholars. According to the information of Jasso (Japan Student Overseas Organization), as of January 2015, there are about 268 Brazilian undergraduates students at universities in Japan.

The United States also introduced a study abroad program for inter-American nations in 2011, "100 thousand strong in the Americas," which was almost same as Brazil's Science without Frontiers. Through collaboration between the governments of the United States and Latin American nations, their companies and their universities, the program would send 100 thousand US students to study in Latin America. In the US-Brazil presidential meeting held in Brazil, both Obama and Rousseff stressed that the US program would complement Brazil's.

Science without Frontiers, with its aim to raise Brazil's level in science, technology and innovation, was not a point of discussion with the developed countries alone. It was also discussed with emerging nations such as China and India. For example, when Rousseff visited China to participate in the 3rd BRICS summit in Sanya, China, she talked about it with the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, the day before the summit. Rousseff also attended a high-level conference on Brazil and China's science, technology and innovation.

3.2. South-South Relations: Promoting Investment and Trade

The core of the Lula administration's South-South relations (mainly African countries) was cooperation in areas such as economic reconstruction, democratization, food and agriculture, and health. The economic development of the African region was indispensable for encouraging Brazilian companies to invest in Africa. It was also important to shore up support for Brazil's plans for UN reform. An additional reason for why Brazil intended to strengthen its relations with Africa was Lula's deep feeling of regret for Brazil's colonial history (its negative heritage) as an importer of African people as slaves on Brazil's sugar plantations [The Economist 2012].

Brazilian companies' advance into Africa was remarkable even in the Lula administration. This occurred especially in Portuguese-speaking nations such as Angola and Mozambique. As a trading partner, Africa became important for Brazil. If we regard the region of Africa as a unit, it is Brazil's fourth largest trading partner after China, Argentina, and the United States.

Based on the Lula administration's strong relations with Africa, Rousseff continued to engage in south-south diplomacy as the axis of Brazil's foreign policy. Besides technical cooperation in the agriculture and food sector, Rousseff also intended to promote investment and trade activities. Not only did the leaders of Portuguese-speaking nations visit Brazil but non-Portuguese nations such as Guinea,

Tanzania and Benin also went to Brazil in 2011 and 2012, and Rousseff often talked with them about Brazilian private investment. In October 2012, Rousseff visited Pretoria where the IBSA summit was being held. While there, she also visited the presidents of South Africa, Mozambique and Angola to talk about Brazilian investment and trade. This might illustrate Rousseff's diplomatic aim to involve business in Brazil's south-south relations.

Originally, for Africa, Brazil offered technical and economic cooperation as international aid. In particular, so-called triangular cooperation, where the partnership between Brazil and one more developed country offers economic cooperation to an African nation, was often carried out during the Lula administration. In particular, the economic cooperation among Japan, Brazil and Mozambique, called ProSAVANA (Mozambique tropical savanna agricultural development) was based on the experience of Japanese-Brazilian technical cooperation in the 1970s that developed the so-called Cerrado, the center-west region of Brazil. These styles of triangular cooperation were inherited by the Rousseff administration. Besides Africa, this approach was extended to Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and Oceania. Partners with Brazil at present not only include developed nations such as Japan, the United States, Spain, Canada, Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, but also developing countries like Israel and Egypt.

3.3. South American Integration

Since the Cardoso and Lula administrations, South America has become an important diplomatic axis, and the Rousseff administration continues this strategy. According to the US political think-tank, CSIS, "Since Lula took office in 2003, the PT has focused on the strength and consolidation of Brazil's influence over South America. From the perspective of the PT, what ultimately gains traction with their base is the notion that South America's problems should be discussed and solved by South American countries – under Brazil's leadership." About UNASUR, CSIS explained this as follows:

From the perspective of PT, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) remains the region's essential diplomatic project. Based on the premise that isolation is unproductive for solving problems, Dilma's foreign policy for the region has been based on the adoption of a persuasive approach to preserving

democratic order in the region. UNASUR integration has, in turn, a robust ideological component that joins the countries ruled by center-left governments, driving Brazil's greater attentiveness to the region under Lula and Dilma. [Meacham, Carl and Hussein Kalout 2014, 3]

Brazilian foreign policy researchers, for example, Gratius and Saraiava, explained that there are three dimensions to Brazil's South American diplomacy: the relationship with Argentina, Mercosul and the South American summit, and UNASUR. These three dimensions are mutually related [Gratius and Saraiava 2013]. According to the UNASUR Treaty, it is important to understand that the process of South American integration should be based on the efforts which Mercosul and the Andean Community experienced in the making of their own regional integrations².

In other words, Mercosul and UNASUR involve inter-related processes. Also, the objective of UNASUR "is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, an integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizing political dialogues, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socioeconomic inequality, in order to achieve social inclusion and the participation of civil society, to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States." [Treaty of the UNASUR, 2nd article]³

Mercosul and UNASUR are not the same, since the former is about economic integration (the Customs Union). However, they can be regarded as being the same in terms of their objectives and background. Therefore, it is not possible to consider Mercosul as the same as NAFTA, simply an agent of economic integration. This way of thinking might have strongly influenced Rousseff, who considered Mercosul not merely as an economic integration.

² On UNASUR, refer to the following sites for the established treaty text (Portuguese version). *Tratado Constitutivo da UNASUR* <http://www.itamaraty.org.br/temas/america-do-sul-e-integracao-regional/UNASUR> (last viewed, August 1st, 2014) .

³*Tratado Constitutivo da UNASUR(artículo 2 objetivo).*

3.4. Inactive Foreign Policies under the First Mandate of Rousseff Government

Strategically, Rousseff's diplomacy remained unchanged. The foreign policy staff did not change drastically. Above all, Marco Aurélio Garcia who had supported Lula diplomacy continued to remain as a Diplomatic Advisor and Celso Amorim, the foreign minister during the eight years of the Lula administration also stayed, although not as foreign minister.

However, diplomacy during Rousseff's administration, compared to that under Lula, seemed to be less salient. The ex-Foreign minister, Antonio Patriota, said that "now Brasília could become a city where diplomacy could develop." It is also true that Rousseff, while not visiting so many countries, received many foreign nations' leaders in Brasília. However, *Veja*, a famous Brazilian magazine, said that during Rousseff's first three years, she welcomed only one third of the global leaders that Lula did. Even though Rousseff stressed the importance of South American Integration, the number of her visits to South American nations was clearly less than Lula (*Veja*, July 30th, 2014).

Strategically Rousseff diplomacy seems the same, but it has had fewer visible results. Why has Brazil become far from active in its foreign policy? In the author's opinion, there may be two reasons: 1) The domestic economic situation has changed, 2) the international situation has also changed and become more complicated.

First of all, we consider the change in the domestic economy when Rousseff took office in 2011. According to Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the economic growth rate in 2011 was 3.9%, compared to 7.6% in Lula's last year, 2010. While the economic recovery was a most important issue for the Rousseff government, the downturn in Brazil's economy led to the degradation of Brazil's image in the global community. Given such a fragile situation, it was difficult for Brazil to speak out so actively in multilateral meetings. Unlike Lula, who could personify Brazil's economic boom in his foreign relations.

Second (and a more serious reason than the first) was the change in international relations. The G20, which includes Brazil and several emerging nations, was started during Lula's second administration, and it certainly had momentum. The G20 was expected to herald an alternative international economic order for the G7, but, as time passed, it experienced difficulties. A consensus was often not reached. The conflict

between the advanced economies and the developing economies remains unsolved. Now the G20 as an institution cannot be said to function as well as before⁴.

In the complicated international relations, such as Russia's territorial expansion (Ukraine and Crimea) and the instability of Middle East politics, it seemed difficult for Brazil to actively commit in the global agenda.

Once the Lula administration, whether rightly or not, was active in foreign policy toward the Middle East. He said that Brazil could contribute to solve the problems of both the Arabs and Israel by bringing peace to the region. Lula, in collaboration with Turkey, tried to commit to the problem related to Iran's nuclear development in order to prevent the international community from imposing economic sanctions on Iran. However, Rousseff was inactive in terms of the agenda of Iran's nuclear development.

In other cases, she tried to show her commitment to the Middle East issues by saying that Brazil denounced Israel's invasion of Gaza and its "disproportionate use of force." A spokesman from Israel's foreign ministry strongly criticized Brazil calling it a diplomatic dwarf (*anão diplomático*). Israel also said that it regarded Brazil as an irrelevant partner and criticized Brazil for not understanding the Middle East situation at all. On one hand Rousseff's attitude seems to be inactive; inconsistent on the other.

As a famous diplomat, José Botafogo Gonçalves, said, Rousseff seems to dislike international relations and her foreign policy can be characterized as lacking a clear direction. In the middle of a complicated international political scene, Rousseff sometimes did nothing and sometimes behaved inappropriately, which has led to Brazil being criticized and doubted [*Veja*, July 30th, 2014].

3.5. World Cup Diplomacy: The Return of the New Brazil's Foreign Policy?

On the occasion of final game and closing ceremony of World Cup, Rousseff met actively with the leaders of various nations, including Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Vladimir Putin of Russia. Following the closing ceremony of World Cup, Rousseff hosted the leaders of BRICS nations in Fortaleza where their sixth BRICS Summit was held. This meeting was important because of the agreement to establish the New Development Bank (the so-called BRICS Bank) and the Contingent Reserve Agreement (CRA). Also, for the first time, BRICS and UNASUR had a joint meeting, and China, UNASUR and the representatives of CELAC met to reach an

⁴ An American political scientist, Ian Bremmer is such the world is called *G-Zero World*.

official agreement to start the CELAC/China Forum. As organizer, Rousseff could display Brazil to the world⁵.

In retrospect, another important event brought Brazil back into the international community. On September 1st 2013, a former staff of the United States National Security Agency (US-NSA), Edward Snowden, revealed that the US had wiretapped President Rousseff. Due to the seriousness of this news, Rousseff canceled her official visit to the US, and the media revealed that the bilateral relationship had deteriorated. On September 24th 2013 in her speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Rousseff strongly criticized wiretapping as an act against the International Human Rights Treaty (not mentioning the United States by name, however). Then, in November of the same year, in collaboration with Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had also been wiretapped, she proposed to the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations a resolution related to the protection of privacy, and this resolution was adopted.

After finishing the World Cup and the BRICS Summit, Brazil finally entered a presidential race. In this election, a dramatic incident occurred. One of the major presidential candidates, Eduardo Campos from the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) died in an airplane accident during the election campaign. Marina Silva, the previous Campos team's vice presidential candidate, decided to run. Finally, there was a runoff between Rousseff and Aécio Neves from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and Rousseff won by a narrow margin.

During the campaign, foreign policy was not the main focus for almost all the candidates. As mentioned before, Rousseff declared during her first mandate that she would continue Lula's foreign policy strategy. She stressed the importance of South American integration, especially regarding integration through infrastructure and finance, besides trade. Mercosul was an issue in which she differed from her run off competitor, Aécio Neves from PSDB. In brief, Rousseff prioritized Mercosul as being an important pillar of Brazil's South American policy, while Neves strongly proposed the need for reforms to Mercosul⁶. Rousseff won the election, and on January 1st 2015, she gave her inaugural speech, in which she reiterated the importance of strengthening the integration of South America [*Portal Planalto* 2015].

⁵ On July 18th, Rousseff held talks with José Manuel Barroso, the chair of the European Union (EU). From July 13th, the closing ceremony of the World Cup until 18th, she moved quickly three cities which were Rio de Janeiro, Fortaleza and Brasília.

⁶ The different stance toward economic integration including Mercosul was felt especially strongly among the business sector, such as the Nacional Confederation of Industry (CNI).

Concluding Remarks: What Is the Post-New Brazil's Foreign Policy?

The protest in July 2013 and its government response, together with the stagnation of the Brazilian economy are signs that the New Brazil has already started to change. How about foreign policy? Has that also changed? In the beginning, Rousseff intended to continue Lula's active foreign policy, which had opened the way to Brazil becoming a global player, and then she also could embody the New Brazil. However, various situations around her finally caused problems for her tentative approach. In conclusion, the four years of Rousseff's first mandate seemed to make Brazil less salient in the global arena. It is difficult at present to identify the turning point in this transition, but it is true that Rousseff's first administration government and the internal and external environment surrounding her created the era of Post-New Brazil.

At the same time, we cannot say exactly what the Post-New Brazil stands for diplomatically. Even if Rousseff tried to follow Lula and seek the same objectives, she would not be able to achieve the same results. This is a Post-New Brazil, but we are not sure that this is what Brazilians really want.

Now the world is also changing: the expansion of Islamic power not only in the Middle East but also in the world as a whole, Russia's territorial expansion, the fall in oil prices and its consequences for oil-exporting nations, and the improvement in US-Cuban relations, etc. We cannot discuss the future of Brazil's foreign policies without looking at these global changes. Especially, due to geographical proximity, the changes in the inter-American system (especially regarding Cuba and Venezuela as anti-American nations and their diplomatic orientation in the near future) will strongly affect Brazil.

Rousseff said in the interview to the Brazilian foreign policy magazine, *Política externa* that foreign policy might change since it is just one component of national (or government) policy. Rousseff also talked about what conditions might give a change in foreign policy. According to her, this depends on developmental strategies introduced democratically and the global change in geography and economics [*Política externa*, September 19th, 2014]. Often in the past, Brazil's foreign policy was connected to economic development strategy. The main agenda of the year 2015 will be economic recovery for Brazil. Maybe there is not enough time to think about foreign relations. At least the second mandate of Rousseff administration will not be able to prioritize the foreign policy. The diplomacy of the Post-New Brazil will depend on the recovery of Brazilian economy.

Table. A List of Middle East and African Nations Where Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff (1st mandate) Visited

	Middle East	Africa	Asia(as a reference)
Cardoso	never visited	Angola, Mozambique, South Africa(twice each)	1st mandate: China, India, Malaysia, Japan 2nd mandate: South Korea, Indonesia, East Timor
Lula	2003: Syria, Lebanon, UAE, Egypt, Libya 2006: Algeria 2009: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Libya 2010: Israel, Palestine, Qatar, Iran	November 2003: São Tomé e Príncipe, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa July 2004: Gabon, Cabo Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe April 2005: Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Guiné-Bissau, Senegal February 2006: Algeria November 2006: Nigeria October 2007: Burkina Faso, Congo, South Africa, Angola April 2008: Ghana October 2008: Mozambique 2009: not visited but received from many African nations. July 2010: Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania	1st mandate: India, China, South Korea, Japan 2nd mandate: India (twice), china (twice). Japan(due to G8 summit at Hokkaido)
Rousseff (1st mandate)	never visited	October 2011: South Africa, Mozambique, Angola February 2013: Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea March 2013: South Africa May 2013: Ethiopia	April 2011: China March 2012: India

Source: The author's compilation.

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